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Introduction
This paper contributes to debates about climate change policy and technology transfer by analyzing the success factors underlying collaboration between private sector investors and local communities in developing countries.
Technology transfer is now widely recognized as an important means of implementing policies to mitigate anthropogenic climate change. Indeed, technology transfer also forms a crucial element of environmental 'leapfrogging' -or the ability for developing countries to undergo industrialization without the same levels of pollution as experienced elsewhere (Perkins, 2004) . In recent years, various policymaking organizations have urged that technology transfer involves multiple stakeholders in both state-and non-state sectors, and that stakeholders should collaborate to enhance technology transfer (IPCC, 2000) . Historic experience, however, has suggested that successful collaboration among non-state actors has been hampered by two important factors.
First, successful technology transfer by private companies has frequently not occurred under artificial conditions of subsidies and grants, but instead requires long-term and reliable cost recovery. Building capacity for technology transfer therefore does not just mean identifying potential uses for new technologies, but also in creating mechanisms that allow new technologies to be paid for locally, and kept competitive under market conditions (Gregory et al, 1997; Martinot, et al, 1997) .
Second, technology transfer cannot succeed without an appreciation of the local socioeconomic needs and concerns of host communities. Many historic attempts at technology transfer have failed because intended users have not understood or even opposed new technologies, or because planners have failed to appreciate the impacts of technological change on the prices and availabilities of local resources. Capacity building for new technologies therefore also requires researching local perceptions and needs for technology (UNEP, 2003) .
These problems were acknowledged by the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in June 2004 (UNFCCC, 2004). Business representatives within the EGTT noted that much
Capacity building for technology transfer had so far tended to focus too exclusively on the supply of technologies, and on activities involving governments or international organizations. Instead, they urged that more attention be given to the business needs of companies who distribute environmental technologies. Moreover, they suggested that the group needed to acknowledge technology 'diffusion' as an important process alongside innovation and development. In essence, they recommended that more attention should be given to the demand-led aspects of technology transfer and on the interactions of private investors and end users. But, to date, there has been comparatively little discussion of the success factors underlying such collaboration between non-state actors.
This paper seeks to address this concern by identifying the success factors within collaboration between private investors and local communities in developing countries.
By doing this, the paper also seeks to advance understandings of public-private collaboration: 'private' referring to the private-sector investors in new and renewable energy technologies, and 'public' referring to citizens, or 'the public' at large. These nonstate actors are most intricately involved in the kind of technology diffusion discussed by the EGTT. Moreover, many observers of climate change negotiations have proposed that this kind of community involvement in technology transfer and UNFCCC-related investment projects should offer a so-called 'development dividend' by integrating climate change mitigation and local development needs (IISD, 2004 ).
The paper is divided into three key sections. The first reviews debates about technology transfer for climate change mitigation, the responses of the UNFCCC, and the potential role of new approaches to partnerships in enhancing technology transfer. The second considers case studies of public-private partnerships involving investors and communities in Thailand and the Philippines in the growing sectors of waste management and waste-to-energy, which are often considered to offer 'development dividends.' The third draws lessons from these case studies for policy debates, including the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and capacity building for technology transfer.
Climate technology transfer and public-private cooperation (i) Technology transfer and climate change mitigation
'Technology transfer' is well known to be an important, but controversial topic within international environmental negotiations (IPCC, 2000) . In environmental terms, technology transfer refers to the need to encourage the adoption of new, clean, technologies in countries or locations where such technology is not yet commonplace.
Some developing countries refused to sign the UNFCCC and Agenda 21 before developed countries had stated some commitment to technology transfer.
Achieving technology transfer, however, has been difficult for various well-documented reasons (see Martinot et al, 1997; Forsyth, 1999ab; UNEP 2003) .
• First, technology transfer is difficult to define. Companies do not engage in 'technology transfer' as such, but instead with 'leases,' 'contracts,' or 'joint ventures,' which are primarily business concepts with scope for encouraging technology use in new locations.
• Secondly, most environmental technology is now privately owned, and few companies wish to share it without compensation.
• Third, long-term technology transfer is costly, and requires training local people to use and maintain technologies; few companies wish to do this, and often see these as the responsibility of international organizations or official development assistance.
• Fourth, it is sometimes difficult to agree on what is 'environmental technology.'
Technologies have varying environmental impacts for different stakeholders.
Sometimes domestic technologies in developing countries may be more appropriate to local uses than some imports.
• Fifth, despite environmental benefits, some technologies have proven inappropriate for local users and have consequently been abandoned.
• Sixth, many programs of technology transfer have failed to acknowledge the need for long-term financial security and cost-recovery by investors. Cost recovery may require the establishment of new local accounting and financial bodies to collect payments, which requires a new level of management and intervention.
Related to this, cost recovery has to be conducted in careful conjunction with any subsidies. Subsidies have often backfired as incentives to adopt new technologies by creating short-term and unsustainable economic conditions that have repelled both investors and consumers. But careful use of subsidies, with long-term movement to full cost recovery, can ensure successful technology transfer (Gregory et al, 1997) .
Consequently, 'technology transfer' is not one simple process but the conjunction of various acts, over a long time, for a wide range of products and services. Technology has to be appropriate: it has to be seen to be useful by local people, or in-tune with other local products and markets. (For example, one United Nations project in India in the 1970s to introduce electricity generators using cow dung failed to predict that the price of dung would increase, leading to a shortage of fuel. In the Philippines in the 1980s, photovoltaic-powered water pumps were seen to be unnecessarily complicated compared with pre-existing hand-pumps, and hence abandoned). suggests that 'communities' may be homogeneous and think alike. Neither is likely to be true. Accordingly, there is a need to acknowledge greater diversity of needs and people within communities before seeing how they can interact with private companies. The next section how such partnerships between communities and private companies may emerge, in particular by reducing investors' costs, and increasing community governance of new technologies.
(iii) Enhancing partnerships between investors and communities
So, how can collaboration be enhanced between private investors and communities?
Much discussion of public-private collaboration to date has focused on relationships between states and private companies, such as the common model of Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) often used for infrastructure projects. As an alternative, public-private cooperation may be less formalized and more localized, and include negotiations, agreements, and task sharing between investors and public sector bodies such as local governments, NGOs, or citizen bodies. They may also include contracting with local enterprises that are too small to be considered large companies, but which nonetheless are representative of local communities. In principle, such partnerships offer 'win-win' solutions for investors and communities by reducing the costs of implementing new technologies, and by increasing local participation in defining technologies and their purposes. Such initiatives have been called 'civic environmentalism,' 'cooperative environmental governance,' or 'pro-poor public-private partnerships' (John, 1994; Glasbergen, 1998; Plummer, 2000; UNEP, 2000 UNEP, , 2004 Forsyth, 1999a:159) .
Some insights into the structure of partnerships can be achieved from theories about collaboration between diverse actors (see Weber, 1998 ). As discussed above, investors want few technical barriers to investment; large consumer demand for their products;
little resistance against their technology; and a financial system that allows long-term cost recovery. Conceptually, partnerships using these factors can be summarized in terms of transaction costs and assurance mechanisms (Weber, 1998 involves no burning. Biomethanation therefore promises methane extraction (for electricity generation), a residual sludge (used for composting), and the potential to recycle the remaining municipal waste. At present, many investors are using both incineration and biomethanation to claim financial rewards through the Clean Development Mechanism, although critics are working to ban incineration of waste as a permissible 'climate-friendly' activity under this scheme.
Waste-to-energy is also a good illustration of partnerships between investors and citizens.
Waste management in developing countries frequently involves a wide sector of society, from richer companies and neighborhoods, to the so-called 'waste pickers,' or citizens 5 It should be noted that agricultural waste has been used for energy production for many years, either by incineration or biomethanation for biogas. 6 Pyrolysis is a form of incineration that chemically decomposes organic materials by heat in the absence of oxygen. Pyrolysis typically occurs under pressure and at operating temperatures above 430°C (800°F). and 'Biomass Program' to encourage the contribution of small electricity generators and biomass generation to the national grid. In common with many industrializing countries, tipping fees are rarely paid by citizens on a regular or high enough basis to allow the recovery of costs of urban or agricultural waste management. As a result, local governments need to seek alternative forms of cost recovery for waste management.
Thailand and the Philippines also represent different types of electricity business and potential markets for renewable energy or waste to energy projects. Box 4 summarizes some key differences between Asian countries for investment in renewable energy, and the relative positions of countries according to electricity supply and markets for renewable energy.
It should be noted that the examples described here present just 'snapshots' of current partnership and technology investment practices, and that practices will change in future years. Changes will occur as climate change becomes more important in influencing people's lives, and as it becomes an increasingly legitimate policy concern within different arenas. The means of achieving public-private collaboration will also evolve over time as successful case studies become known, and governments, investors, and
NGOs take action to create enabling environments for collaboration. region of Bulacan is one of the most important rice-growing zones of the Philippines, and the large quantity of rice husks produced as agricultural waste offered an important opportunity for using efficient incineration methods to convert these to energy. However, the project failed when the financiers learned about the way Enron had organized its contracts for supplying rice husks. Enron had made contracts with some 150 rice millers in order to supply rice husks, and needed to maximize supply in order to fuel its large 40MW plant. As a result, the rice millers quickly learned that Enron had no other suppliers of rice husks, and so could increase the price they wanted for the husks, and thus erode Enron's profitability. Under these conditions, the financiers withdrew their
support.
An alternative outcome was illustrated by a different case in Thailand. Between 2000 and
2004, a Thai-owned company, AT Biopower, sought to build six 16MW power plants using rice husks in the central plains of Thailand. The plan was different to Enron's project in the Philippines in many ways. First, the Thai company sought to build a number of smaller power plants, rather than one large 40MW plant. Secondly, the investor used a variety of techniques to ensure that supply of rice husks remained constant. For example, the investor made contracts with just 20-30 rice millers per power plant, rather than 150. Moreover, he sought to use just 10-15 percent of their total rice husk production, rather than 100 percent, as was the case in Bulacan. The power plants therefore experienced fewer transaction costs in dealing with fewer rice millers than in the Philippines, and did not rely on each miller sharing all of their rice husk production.
Furthermore, millers are contracted to produce a guaranteed quantity of husks in a contract: producers are fined if they fail to deliver, yet are also rewarded with a yearly bonus if they achieve their target. All of these techniques are assurance mechanisms to ensure that partnerships between companies succeed. Yet, they are also crucial to ensuring the successful embedding of new energy technologies.
(ii) The importance of transaction costs
Transaction costs are the costs of interacting with partners, and usually refer to financial costs; time spent negotiating; and problems of misunderstanding. The best partnerships have fewest transaction costs. But defining transaction costs may also include knowing where to draw boundaries between partners, concerning which activities each partner is to take. Examples from the Philippines show the need to reduce costs with different partners.
Between 1996−1998, a US-based investor in biomethanation sought to establish a new methane-recovery and electricity generating plant in Ayala Alabang near Manila in the Philippines. The investor used two techniques to reduce transaction costs and maximize revenue for itself. First, the company negotiated a contract with a local NGO to allow the NGO to supply waste from pigs and cows in the region. This was in both parties'
interests: the US investor did not want to spend money on collecting waste (it had no expertise in this area, and the transaction costs of paying local collectors was too high);
plus the NGO wanted to reduce waste locally. Secondly, the NGO also negotiated another contract with the local municipal government to buy the entire municipal waste stream from the locality, and hired local waste pickers to sort the waste into organic and inorganic waste. Segregating the waste in this was is necessary in order to extract the organic material for biomethanation, and to make money from recycling inorganic material such as metal and paper.
Unfortunately, this investment project failed for several reasons. The most important failure was because local landowners (including the municipality) increased the rent payable on the power plant's land because they believed the project was more profitable than it was. But in addition, the investing company quickly realized that the stream of recyclable (inorganic) waste was much smaller than they anticipated because the waste pickers and waste transporters were removing the most valuable elements of waste before they arrived at the plant. The company quickly decided that it was not possible for them to control the supply of recyclable waste, and so decided to waste recycling from its business objectives. The company has since focused on biomethanation, composting, and carbon credits as its main profits, and has left most recycling to the local people.
Using partners to reduce transaction costs − rather than let them increase costs − seems to be the lesson. In other projects, local waste pickers have also been hired to collect or segregate waste because it allows investment projects to be accepted by local people as opportunities rather than threats to their livelihoods. It also allows investors to find area of collaboration that maximize mutual benefits. The same US investor has later persisted with other biomethanation projects in the Philippines (notably in Baguio in Luzon, and General Santos in Mindanao), where local people are hired in order to conduct waste sorting, but where the investor does not seek to restrict the local people from conducting recycling in ways that benefit them. Much of this success comes from defining boundaries around different business activities: the investor focuses on biomethanation and electricity generation, the local pickers on recycling. This way, both sides can maximize their own profits without undermining the partnership. would be owned by, or benefit, a local politician who has widespread influence over a variety of businesses. The discussion about the benefits or risks of the plant was therefore related to other debates between those who supported or opposed the politician.
In the Philippines, investors in biomethanation have also received opposition from national and international NGOs who are opposed to waste-to-energy in general. In the Philippines, environmentalists (and especially the NGO, Greenpeace) undertook a successful campaign to ban incineration of urban waste, and to enforce segregation of waste at source into organic and inorganic. These steps were taken in order to reduce the vast production of waste that is now overloading the Philippines' cities, and to resist incineration of waste. But for many activists, this activism has also included opposition to biomethanation, even though it does not involve incineration, because few activists understand the process of electricity generation via anaerobic digestion, and because some activists believe any form of waste-to-energy is unacceptable because it legitimizes the production of waste. In the city of Baguio, in the northern island of Luzon, one US investor faced opposition from a local NGO who claimed that the biomethanation technology would remove people's livelihoods by preventing them from making compost.
There are, of course, many examples where political activism undermines investment in new technologies. But how can companies overcome local resistance? In these case studies, investors took several steps to improve local trust, and to seek win−win solutions.
In Suphan Buri, AT Biopwer undertook an extensive public education campaign, seeking to explain how rice husks would lead to electricity without significant pollution. The investor also committed funds from the plant to support local community development projects, and allowed citizens to monitor pollution, with a commitment to pay compensation if pollution exceeded limits. After the disappointment at Suphan Buri, the company also took care to locate plants in sites that did not have the same reputation for political division.
In the biomethanation plants, the investors deliberately tried to win local support by offering jobs to the local waste pickers and other residents who were concerned. In Ayala Alabang, near Manila, the American investor sought to avoid local resistance by hiring waste pickers to segregate waste. But after this proved to be unprofitable (because the pickers took the valuable waste for themselves), the company adopted different strategies of either not seeking ownership of recyclable waste at all, or of hiring waste pickers to do different jobs, such as operating machinery or organizing waste segregation.
The implications of these examples are that governing public happiness with partnerships between local people and investors can be very difficult, and be beyond the control of investors. Most companies have tried to maximize public trust by proving information about the new technologies, and by including many different people in the production process. But some technologies − such as pyrolysis − must control more of the waste stream, and therefore have fewer opportunities for local involvement. Furthermore, in the political battles surrounding the choice of waste-to-energy technology, statements are often not linked to localities, but come from national or international NGOs and activists.
Conclusion: Lessons for capacity building for technology transfer
This paper has analyzed case studies of waste-to-energy investment in Thailand and the Philippines for two main reasons: to identify success factors underlying collaboration between private companies and communities to enhance climate technology transfer, and to seek examples of the so-called 'development dividend' -or where investment for climate change mitigation can also provide local development benefits. The paper focused on three key concepts of transaction costs, assurance mechanisms, and trust and accountability as determining factors of partnerships. Box 5 summarizes some of the key lessons for these factors concerning collaboration between companies and communities.
Box 6 summarizes potential action points by different stakeholders, including the state (and for which, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies may also participate at each stage).
These tables may assist in building long-term lessons for the evolution of partnerships within environmental policy as both climate change and pubic-private collaboration become more accepted as policy concerns in coming years. It should be noted, too, that this discussion in no way diminishes the need for continued attention to state-led technology initiatives, or research and development of technologies.
[Box 5 around here]
[Box 6 around here]
The paper draws three key lessons for enabling environments and capacity building for technology transfer as discussed under the UNFCCC. First, capacity building for technology transfer is not simply the extension of state services and information, but is also strengthening the ability for non-state actors to make agreements in ways that address mutual aims. The case studies from Thailand and the Philippines showed that various companies are keen to advance various technologies of waste-to-energy in ways that depend on some element of cooperation with local users. For both sides, the ability to reach agreements about (say) the supply of waste, or the livelihood benefits from power plants is the most important consideration for these actors. For this reason, the statement from the UNFCCC (2003a:4) , that capacity building is 'transferring experience, knowledge, skills and practices' is insufficient: capacity must be enhanced locally as well as transferred.
Second, technology transfer via non-state actors must not be described only in environmental or pubic-policy terms as an activity in its own right, but from the perspectives that make most sense to participants. As discussed at the start of this paper, 'technology transfer' is not something that private companies deliberately seek to do, but create as a by-product of leasing, contracting, or joint ventures with other collaborators.
Similarly, many end users do not necessarily perceive technology transfer as attractive in its own right: they use different technologies for the other benefits of livelihood or lifestyle that they provide. In the examples from Thailand and the Philippines, disputes over technologies were sometimes dominated by other political concerns, such as concern at foreign investors or local politicians, rather than the details of the technologies themselves. Similarly, for investors, the possible achievement of climate change credits via the CDM was less attractive than achieving minimum transaction costs and long-term security of income (via power purchase agreements or similar assurance mechanisms).
Facilitating these may be a more effective way of enhancing technology transfer via private investment than in assuming companies have an overt wish to conduct technology transfer for its own sake.
A third need for capacity building is to acknowledge that 'communities' are more diverse than commonly described. UNEP (2004:5) Maximize assurance mechanisms. Assurance mechanisms are the devices − such as contracts and understandings − that keep both partners together in a partnership. In Thailand, AT Biopower successfully created incentives to ensure that the suppliers of rice husks honored their contracts by making sure the power plant was not dependent on any one supplier, and by giving cash bonuses to suppliers who performed well. In the Philippines, investors in biomethanation sought successful collaboration with local citizens by ensuring that both parties had something to gain from the completion of power plants (i.e. citizens benefited from waste reduction and the opportunity to profit from recycling; the company gained from having access to the organic waste). Successful assurance mechanisms also mean reduced transaction costs, as both sides have incentives to perform.
Maximize trust and accountability. Trust and accountability indicate the extent to which participants, and especially communities, perceive partnerships as acceptable. Sometimes this means accepting that local social and political contexts may shape how technology diffusion is seen. These factors may also include local or national political or environmental activism. In the central plains of Thailand, some citizens wrong interpreted the proposed power plant as related to local political conflicts, and hence opposed it. In the Philippines, some activists unfairly accused biomethanation of being another form of incineration. In these cases, companies have responded by engaging in gentle dialogue with critics, and by including some element of community development into their projects. Maximizing trust and accountability also enhances assurance mechanisms and reduces transaction costs, and is a role that governments can play.
